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For Judith S. Kaye
Susan N. Hermant
Chief Judge Judith Kaye was a prolific author of
scholarship as well as judicial opinions. I am moved to know that
the Brooklyn Law Review is publishing, posthumously, her last
essay written for publication, and I am honored to have been
invited to take part in this special issue dedicated to Judge Kaye,
whom I knew in a number of different capacities over the years.
Writing a memorial tribute is a bittersweet experience.
Mourning the loss of a great woman is balanced by the positive
aspects of eulogizing: the pleasure of thinking about the life
rather than only the loss of life, and of working to find words to
capture and share what made that life memorable. The pieces
published in this issue help to ensure Judge Kaye's legacy by
describing some of her many contributions to the development
of the law, and also by remembering who she was as a person:
brilliant yet gracious, generous and wise, down to earth but
somehow regal.
An additional sadness I am sure many of us have
experienced in composing a eulogy is knowing that the person
in question will not get to hear the tribute we have spent so
much time and thought putting into words. If only I could have
said this to her while she was alive, we think, she would have
known what I thought of her and what I will remember.
I find myself in the fortunate position of having been able
to share my tribute with Judge Kaye herself. The Albany Law
Review has kindly allowed our law review to reprint an article I
originally published there, "Portrait of a Judge: Judith S. Kaye,
Dichotomies, and State Constitutional Law." That article was
based on my speech at the unveiling of Chief Judge Kaye's
portrait at the New York Court of Appeals in 2011, on her
retirement from the court. Judge Kaye was characteristically
warm and effusive in reacting to my speech on that occasion,
focusing not on my praise of her skill as a judge and writer, not
t Susan N. Herman is a Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School and President of the American Civil Liberties Union. She and Judith Kaye both
earned their B.A.s from Barnard College and their J.D.s from New York University
School of Law.
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on my reminiscences of our interactions, not on my personal
compliments, but on my comments about her championship of
state constitutional law, a subject of great importance to her. So
when Judge Kaye learned that the Albany Law Review was about
to publish "An Interdisciplinary Examination of State Courts,
State Constitutional Law, and State Constitutional Adjudication,"
she suggested that the editors include a version of my speech.
I have in my files a handwritten note I received after that
edition of the law review was published, in which Judge Kaye
thanks me for my contribution and notes, with characteristic
modesty, "Perhaps what most excites me is that you are teaching
at least one class on state constitutions in your basic con law class!"
If you visit the New York Court of Appeals in Albany,
you can see the portrait of Judith Kaye, the first woman on the
court and the first woman on the walls of the court.
Here is my own portrait.
PORTRAIT OF A JUDGE: JUDITH S. KAYE, DICHOTOMIES,
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Susan N. Herman*
I. INTRODUCTION: A CAREER OF THEORY AND PRACTICE
First, let me say how honored and delighted I am to be here to
start us out on this afternoon's project, which I would describe as all
of us working together to compose a verbal portrait of Chief Judge
Judith S. Kaye to go along with the very impressive physical
portrait now gracing the back wall of this courtroom. In painting a
portrait, we all start with our sketches and our mental snapshots of
particular scenes or moments. So before getting to the topic on
which I've been asked to speak, Chief Judge Kaye's scholarship, I
want to start by sharing with you a few of the snapshots in my
mind-my own personal memories and impressions of Chief Judge
Kaye over the years-because they are a key part of the background
for my piece of the portrait we are creating today.
A. Judith Kaye and the New York Jury
The first time that I saw Judith Kaye in action was when I'd been
called for jury duty in New York City some years ago. I was sitting
among the pool of prospective Brooklyn jurors when a video came on
featuring Judith Kaye speaking to all of us there. This was
something that had never happened before-that anybody, no less
the Chief Judge of New York State, really tried to explain to
prospective jurors what they were being asked to do and why it was
important, rather than just intoning some Law Day homilies and
* Susan N. Herman is Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and President
of the American Civil Liberties Union. B.A., Barnard College, 1968; J.D., N.Y.U. Law School,
1974. The author wishes to thank Rita Cant for her heroic research assistance and the
Capital District Women's Bar Association and the New York Court of Appeals for the
invitation to speak at the unveiling of Chief Judge Kaye's portrait.
This article was first presented as a speech in tribute to Chief Judge Kaye at her portrait
unveiling at the New York Court of Appeals in October 2011. Transcription of the remarks
was graciously provided through the financial support of the Historical Society and the
Capital District Women's Bar Association.
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then deluging them with commands and cattle-herding
bureaucracy. But there was Chief Judge Kaye up on the screen
explaining eloquently and inspiringly why she believed jury duty to
be a critical part of our constitutional system. Her remarks
signaled that I, along with everyone else in the room, was being
taken seriously as an integral part of the justice system and was
entitled to respect. In addition, this video (which I'm sure Chief
Judge Kaye supervised because no detail went unnoticed) used
filmmaking and storytelling arts to communicate with people-in a
way that could really capture their imaginations-why they were
being asked to give up a part of their personal lives to perform this
public function. Instead of just assuming that jury service was a
fact of life, the video treated the opinions of the prospective jurors
about their jury service as important. And so the video took pains
to educate, explain, and persuade so that the prospective jurors
would have a basis for deciding for themselves that they were doing
something valuable.
I don't know how many of you may have seen this video, and I
actually don't know if it's still being shown. But even though I don't
recall exactly how long ago I was called to jury duty on that
occasion, I vividly recall that in this video-while the voices of
Judge Kaye and other experts talked admiringly about the nature
and history of our jury system-the viewer was shown a
reenactment of an alternative system of justice from our Anglo-
American past: trial by ordeal. A woman dressed in appropriate
period costume was being led into the water by uniformed
purveyors of justice to see if she would sink or float. My fellow
Brooklynites hooted at the idea that whether or not the water
rejected her could be regarded by anyone as a reasonable basis for
deciding whether or not this woman was a witch, a rather
questionable charge to begin with. After seeing this video, I was not
the only person in the room who then thought: Of course I want to
be part of a reasonable and fair system for protecting people against
unjust punishment. Even that brief reenactment-inviting viewers
to empathize with the woman being subjected to such terrifyingly
arbitrary treatment-helped to persuade the viewers that such
outmoded forms of trial are no way to make a decision and certainly
not a way they would want important decisions about their own
lives to be made. That perception made the prospect of disrupting
one's own everyday life for jury service sting a little less.
That video, of course, was just one part of Chief Judge Kaye's
important campaign-one of her priorities on assuming her position
[Vol. 75.41978
Portrait of a Judge: Judith S. Kaye
as Chief Judge-to transform the experience of jury duty for all the
people of the State of New York. And as a first glimpse of Judge
Kaye, the campaign reveals features of its architect that have
become confirmed through later experience: brilliance tempered
with humanity and humility, a deep and abiding love and respect
for our Constitution and system of justice, devotion to efficiency
without neglecting the humanity of the people affected by the
system in question, and a view of the arts as a partner of the law.
So this is a good beginning for one of my themes for today, which
is to note that any portrait of Chief Judge Kaye has to be multi-
faceted because Judith Kaye cannot be pigeonholed into a few 'this
is what she's like' adjectives. Somehow Chief Judge Kaye manages
to bridge what people often regard as dichotomies. Take Aristotle's
dichotomy of the man (or woman) of theoretical wisdom and the
man (or woman) of practical wisdom-supposedly two distinct and
defining models of how people think.' Even in this little video about
jury duty, Kaye shows her theoretical wisdom: the intellectual
rationalization and eloquent articulation of the importance of the
jury trial and its role in the American justice system. At the same
time, the transformation of the experience of jurors in New York
State worked on a very practical level. In addition to offering
inspiration, Chief Judge Kaye was also paying attention to
promoting the physical comfort of jurors and prospective jurors, to
treating them with dignity, and to figuring out ways to avoid
wasting their time. But this was more than just a case of
accomplishing two unrelated goals with one set of actions. The
theory-that jury service is one way in which the Constitution
empowers the People-was integrally tied to these practical
innovations. Taking jurors seriously is more than just kindness. It
is the result of recognizing that jurors are one-half of our judicial
system, and therefore should not be treated as ignorant, surly,
temporary servants of judges who show up only because they are
compelled to do so, and need to be manhandled into serving their
function. By treating jurors with respect, we show them that the
constitutional theory that "We, the People" are the true
government2 is actually being put into practice. This attention to
both the theory3 and practice of jury service has been an invaluable
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV, at L76-78 (Sarah Brodie, ed. & Christopher
Rowe, ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
a Judge Kaye has also contributed to the academic scholarship on jury reform. See Judith
S. Kaye, Why Juries? Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 185, 185-88 (2008)
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contribution to the people of New York State and to justice
generally.
So that video and that campaign are snapshot number one.
B. Judith Kaye, Interviewee
The first time that I actually spoke with Chief Judge Kaye was in
anticipation of a program in which we were both involved. The
National Association of Women Judges had planned a Saturday
night dinner during its annual conference and had decided that the
entertainment at the end of the dinner would be something of great
significance to all the women judges in the room: an interview with
the first woman justice on the United States Supreme Court,
Sandra Day O'Connor, and the first woman judge on the New York
Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye. I was invited to conduct that after-
dinner interview. As my husband quipped, it was my chance to be
Oprah.
We had planning calls: I spoke with both Justice O'Connor and
Chief Judge Kaye on the telephone. When I spoke with Judith
Kaye, the first thing she said to me was, "I see we both went to
Barnard and to NYU Law School." Now isn't this typical? As busy
as she must have been, she had taken the time to look me up and
had done research on me. She told me at one point that she was a
bit nervous about what I might ask her during the interview-
which she needn't have been, as she handled all of the questions
beautifully. Here again, Judith Kaye bridged a dichotomy: between
her own superstar stature and a genuine humility that is not
always easy for such a public figure to maintain.
The conference at which this dinner was scheduled to take
place-and did take place-was held during the first week of
October 2001, just a few weeks after 9/11, in New York City. The
dinner had originally been scheduled to take place at the elegant
Windows on the World restaurant atop the World Trade Center, a
restaurant which had suddenly and shockingly ceased to exist.
What was quite remarkable was that so many of those women
(explaining jury reform in terms of public outreach and courthouse team building); Judith S.
Kaye, Why Every Chief Judge Should See 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (2007)
(recognizing the advances in the jury system-including the amenities, diversity, and
technology-since the release of the film); Judith S. Kaye & Albert M. Rosenblatt,
Introduction to Special Edition on Juries, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (2001) (identifying New York's
efforts at jury reform since 1993); Judith S. Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62
ALB. L. REV. 1491, 1494-96 (1999) (extolling changes to summoning methods and jury
sequestration that have made New York courts more juror-friendly).
[Vol. 75.41980
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judges were willing to come to New York anyway, resisting the
climate of fear that surrounded New York City at the time, and that
the planning committee was able to hastily relocate the dinner to a
hotel in midtown. In this highly charged atmosphere, the interview
was especially moving and the audience was rapt. Justice O'Connor
wryly referred to herself as the FWOTSC (First Woman on the
Supreme Court, an acronym for the way in which she was so
frequently described) and Judith Kaye shone as the FWOTNYCA
(First Woman on the New York Court of Appeals) as well as the
FWCJOTNYCA (First Woman Chief Justice of the New York Court
of Appeals).
C. Judith Kaye and Law and...
The third vignette that I want to share with you occurred in this
very courtroom. After the Court of Appeals building had been
renovated (a process of which Judge Kaye was justifiably proud
because it came out beautifully), Chief Judge Kaye decided to
celebrate the new courthouse by holding a lecture series featuring
multidisciplinary topics, like law and architecture, instead of just
law. I was invited to speak on a law and literature topic: the People
v. Gillette case'-the New York case which was one of the models for
Theodore Dreiser's great novel, An American Tragedy.5
Interestingly enough, the person who was paired with me to speak
that evening was Francesca Zambello, who had recently directed
the Metropolitan Opera production of an opera based on An
American Tragedy.6 Chief Judge Kaye clearly delighted in the
literature aspect every bit as much as the law, and in managing to
include her beloved world of opera within the confines of the
courthouse. My husband and I had the great pleasure of having a
personalized, guided tour of the newly renovated courthouse by
none other than tour guide Judith Kaye.
Here again you can see dichotomies being bridged: there's the
champion of the law and there's also the lover, appreciator, and
missionary of the arts-literature, opera, architecture; and again
Kaye scarcely seems to notice any tension between what a lot of
people would regard as very different and even irreconcilable
enterprises.
People v. Gillette, 83 N.E. 680 (N.Y. 1908).
a THEODORE DREISER, AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1926).
6 Susan N. Herman, Dreiser "American Tragedy" The Law and the Arts, N.Y. CT. APP.
LECTURE SERIES (June 26, 2006), http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/imptwebcasts.htm.
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D. Judge Kaye and the Two Hats
I want to tell you about one more encounter I had with Chief
Judge Kaye, not counting the numerous times we've bumped into
each other at the Metropolitan Opera or as strap-hanging fare-
payers in the New York City subway. (Imagine that: the Chief
Judge of the State of New York right there in the subway along with
everybody else, rather than spending all her travel time in
limousines.) The last time I saw Chief Judge Kaye in a professional
capacity before today was at a session the New York State Bar
Association held in which they invited Chief Judge Kaye to give
some valedictory remarks and invited some other people (including
her successor, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman) to talk about her
tenure on the New York Court of Appeals. Now at that talk I heard
Judge Kaye for the first time make the priceless comment that
Judge Lippman quoted this morning about her two jobs. She
explained that, somewhat to her surprise as she got down to work,
the job of Chief Judge turned out to comprise two distinct jobs. One
of those jobs is serving as the Chief Administrative Judge of all of
New York, presiding over all the courts of the state. I think Judge
Newton is going to be talking about some of the things that Chief
Judge Kaye did in that capacity.
The second job, of course, is being Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals itself. This entails acting as a judge-hearing the
arguments, deciding the cases, writing the opinions-in addition to
worrying, as Chief, about the well-being and the functioning of the
New York Court of Appeals.
I'm going to repeat Chief Judge Kaye's memorable line, even
though Chief Judge Lippman already mentioned it, because I
shamelessly plagiarize this humorous but apt summary all the time.
"Each of those jobs," said Kaye, "took up eighty percent of my time."
I am sure that all of us who know Judge Kaye would regard that
quip as more true than the laws of nature would seem to allow.
There are some people who just seem to have more hours in their
day than anybody else and Judith Kaye is one of those people. And
there again in that double job we see a kind of dichotomy being
transcended. In addition to a thirty-eight hour day, it takes
tremendous practical skills, administrative skills, and managerial
skills to run the courts of New York State, and to be their
administrator. And it takes a somewhat different range of skills,
including serious intellectual chops, to be a great judge.
1982 [Vol. 75.4
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II. JUDITH KAYE, SCHOLAR
I will now turn to the matter of Chief Judge Kaye's scholarship,
because other speakers more familiar with the courts from the
inside than I am are going to focus on what Chief Judge Kaye did as
an administrator of the courts and as a jurist. As a professor, it's
left to me to talk about Chief Judge Kaye's writing beyond judicial
opinions. The first thing that I want to note is that when you factor
in the amount of time that it consumes to be chief judge of all the
courts of New York State as Chief Administrative Judge and to
have the full workload of a judge on the Court of Appeals, it is
nothing less than astonishing that Judge Kaye managed during
that same period of time to publish over two hundred articles.7 If
you add another 80 percent for her writing job, by my math we're up
to at least 240 percent of an average person's time.
When you look at Chief Judge Kaye's list of articles and the range
of things she's written about, you notice a few things right away, in
addition to the sheer volume of her productivity. One is that there's
a kaleidoscopic range of topics. Judge Kaye has written traditional
law review articles in the usual scholarly art form, voluminous
footnotes and all, about substantive legal topics. I will focus, in a
few minutes, on one of those topics in particular, state
constitutional law, where I think her contributions have been quite
remarkable. In addition to articles about the law in this area and
beyond, the list includes a lot of articles about the administration of
courts, about innovation in the courts, and about how to handle
particular aspects of court management.8 There are articles about
7 See Biography of Judith Kaye, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP,
http://www.skadden.com/index.cfm?contentlD-45&biolD=9178 (last visited May 22, 2012).
* See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Pace Law Review Symposium: New York Matrimonial
Commission, 27 PACE L. REV. 549, 549-50 (2007) (encouraging innovation and cultural
change in matrimonial litigation); Judith S. Kaye, Reducing the Human Costs in Family and
Criminal Court Cases, 45 JUDGES' J. 1, 4 (2007) (advocating for a problem-solving approach to
matrimonial and criminal adjudication); Judith S. Kaye, Albany Law Review Symposium:
Refinement or Reinvention: The State of Reform in New York: The Courts, 69 ALB. L. REV. 831,
831-50 (2006) (identifying and describing various levels and methods of court reform); Judith
S. Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping the Third Branch, 36 U. ToL. L. REV. 899, 900-03 (2005)
(listing Judge Kaye's initiatives in family law, drug courts, and integrated domestic violence
courts); Judith S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today. A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 125, 125-51 (2004) (detailing the problem-solving approach New York has taken
towards judicial reform); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic
Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 5-12 (1999)
(describing the problem-solving approach in domestic violence cases); Judith S. Kaye, Making
the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 1999), http://www.thedaily-
beast.com/newsweek/1999/10/10/making-the-case-for-hands-on-courts.htmi (explaining the
need to shift from traditional to problem-solving approaches); Kaye, Rethinking Traditional
2011/2012] 1983
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the challenges of being a woman as a lawyer and as a judge.9 And
then there are the meta-articles where Judge Kaye, as befits
someone who has been a journalist as well as a lawyer and judge,',
writes about writing-writing about the writing of judicial opinions,
in an article called Judges as Wordsmiths," and writing about legal
scholarship, in an article called One Judge's View of Academic
Writing.'2 Another thing you can notice if you look at many of these
articles, as I've had the pleasure of doing, is that they're all
beautifully written. Some of her articles are highly theoretical,
some are intensely practical, some are intensely personal.
Together, they present a very impressive range of style as well as
subject matter.
The area that I want to focus on in my remarks today is state
constitutional law, an area where Judge Kaye has done a fair
amount of writing both in her judicial opinions and in a number of
articles. Perhaps one reason why the state constitution has drawn
Judge Kaye's attention is-as she herself noted in one of her articles
or I might not have noticed the coincidence-that she and the
current version of the New York State Constitution were born in the
same year.' 3 Now for those of you who don't off the top of your head
recall what year that was, I won't mention it except to say that I
think the years have been much kinder to Judith Kaye. One of
Kaye's recent articles raised the question of whether we need a new
Approaches, supra note 3, at 1494-96 (advocating a shift to the problem-solving approach);
Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How
Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINcs L.J. 851, 854-55 (1997) (same).
9 Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, The Progress of Women Lawyers at Big Firms: Steadied
or Simply Studied?, 76 FonRHAM L. REV. 1941, 1942-44 (2008) (describing the slow advance
of female lawyers at big law firms); Judith S. Kaye, My Story in Six Life Lessons, 45 JUDGES'
J. 31, 32-33 (2006) (recognizing the significant progress made by women in breaking the
gender barrier in the legal profession); Kaye, Women Chiefs: Shaping the Third Branch,
supra note 8, at 899-900: Judith S. Kaye, Moving Mountains: A Comment on the Glass
Ceilings and Open Doors Report, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 573-75 (1996) (same); Judith S.
Kaye, How to Accomplish Success: The Example of Kate Stoneman, 57 ALB. L. REV. 961, 961-
71 (1994) (applauding the life and accomplishments of the first woman admitted to the New
York Bar); Judith S. Kaye, Welcome Address: Is the Law Male?, 69 CHI-KENT L, REV, 301,
301-02 (1993) (discussing the development of feminist legal theory); Judith S. Kaye, Women
in Law: The Law Can Change People, 66 N.Y.U. L, REV. 1929 (1991) (noting the growth in
population of women in the legal profession); Judith S. Kaye, A Prologue in the Guise of an
Epilogue, 57 FOEDHAm L. Rev. 995 (1988) (discussing the barriers women continue to face in
the legal profession).
te Kaye, My Story in Six Life Lessons, supra note 9, at 32.
i1 Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (1997)
12 Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
313 (1989).
is Judith S. Kaye, A Double Blessing: Our State and Federal Constitutions, 30 PACE L.
REV. 844, 849-50 (2010).
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New York State Constitutional Convention to update the
constitution. 4 That our state constitution could stand some
thoughtful renovation is probably another explanation for Judith
Kaye's attention to it.
Another inspiration for her interest in state constitutional law
was undoubtedly a man whose influence I see in a number of Chief
Judge Kaye's judicial opinions as well as in her scholarly writing:
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan.6 Brennan
talked a lot about the nature of our federalism in his judicial
opinions and beyond, and his views led him to become a pioneer in
the field of state constitutional law.' 6 He also offered clear and well-
articulated views about the philosophy of judicial interpretation,
particularly constitutional interpretation.1 7
I want to talk about one article in particular that I think is a very
interesting and innovative piece, reflecting the Brennan influence.
But to help you understand the context for that article, I have to put
on my academic hat for a few minutes and give you a little bit of
background so that you'll be able to place what Chief Judge Kaye is
talking about in the article I'm going to describe and understand
her contributions in that article.
III. THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN A FEDERALIST SYSTEM
As many of you know, if you studied this in law school or if you
have been a consumer or author of opinions by New York state
courts, state constitutions preceded the United States
Constitution.'1 States like Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts, and
New York had their own constitutions that served as models for the
United States Constitution in providing a range of limitations on
what the state government could do, and in promising people rights
of the kind we now tend to associate with the United States
Constitution. 1
In Barron v. City of Baltimore,W a case decided during the first
" Id. at 850.
" Judith S. Kaye, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REv. 14 (1997).
16 Linda Greenhouse, William Brennan, 91, Dies; Gave Court Liberal Vision, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1997, at AL (noting that Justice Brennan's 1977 State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights "became one of the most frequently cited law review articles in
history [.]").
" See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 551-52 (1986).
IS ROBERT L, MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES xiii (2d ed. 2006).
19 Id. at xii-iv.
'* Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-48 (1833)
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half of the nineteenth century, the great John Marshall, Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote a historic
opinion about the relationship between the United States
Constitution and the states. What he said, which most historians
think is basically right, was that the United States Constitution,
including the Bill of Rights and most other aspects of that
Constitution, was not intended to apply to the states.21
Therefore, Marshall said, if a state has done something that you
think violates some aspect of the federal Constitution (like the Fifth
Amendment's takings clause), you're out of luck.2 2 You can't make
that claim. What matters is what the applicable state constitution
says because that's the only constitution that is applied to state
actions.23  Marshall remarked that each state by its own
constitution may limit and restrict its powers as its wisdom
suggests.24 That means that during the eighteenth and most of the
nineteenth century, the state constitutions were the only
meaningful constraints on state power.25 The federal government
was not very big at the time and so the state constitutions were
really the most important sources of law in the country.26
That situation changed quite radically during the second half of
the nineteenth century. After the Civil War, the Reconstruction
Amendments dramatically expanded the authority of the United
21 Id. at 250 ("These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply
them to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them.").
2 See id.
a See id.
21 Id. at 247-48 ('In their several constitutions [the states] have imposed such restrictions
on their respective governments, as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most
proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others
interfere no farther than they are supposed to have a common interest.").
a See Brennan, supra note 17, at 537 (noting that James Madison was a political anomaly
in his day for promoting a stronger centralized government at a time when the individual
states were considered far likelier guardians of individual liberties).
26 Id. Justice Brennan himself contributed enormously to the burgeoning law and literature
on state constitutionalism. Greenhouse, supra note 16; Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles, 73 CAL. L, REV. 1540, 1550-53 (1985); see William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977)
[hereinafter Brennan, Individual Rights] (urging state courts to be more attentive to the
liberties protected in state constitutions); see also Brennan, supra note 17; William J.
Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L.
REV. 11 (1988); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Law of the Land: The North Carolina
Constitution and State Constitutional Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1701 (1992); William J. Brennan,
Jr., Foreword: Symposium on the Arizona Constitution, 20 AmIZ. ST. L.J. (1988). In 1986,
Justice Brennan said that "Irlediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections
afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions . . . is probably the most important
development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times." G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165 (1998).
1986 [Vol. 75.4
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States Constitution to apply more extensively to the states.27 The
chief impetus for this expansion of federal constitutional power was
to prevent the southern states from continuing to treat as enslaved
people who had become free,28 but the sweeping language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing privileges and immunities,
due process, and equal protection of the laws, was not confined to
this particular goal.29
But the nineteenth-century Supreme Court interpreted most of
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment very narrowly,30 and
so federal constitutional law wasn't that potent for many decades.
It wasn't really until Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, and was joined by justices like
William Brennan, that the Supreme Court decided that the federal
Constitution really should have teeth and really should apply to the
states in important ways.3 ' The word they used-this is going to
bring back flashes of law school, either good or bad-was
"incorporation."32 The Fourteenth Amendment talks about
limitations on the state: no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, no state shall deny
any person equal protection of the laws, etc.33 The Warren Court
held that the broad language of the due process clause serves to
apply most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. 34
27 See Brennan, supra note 17. The inspiration for these changes arose in part from
political lessons taught by the Civil War, which "exposed a serious flaw in the notion that
states could be trusted to nurture individual rights." Id
2 See id.
25 Id. ("[The majestic goals of the Fourteenth Amendment were framed in terms of more
general application . . . .")
3 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits only state constitutional violations but not state inaction or private
action); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1872) (construing the
privileges or immunities clause to apply only to the narrow privileges of national citizenship).
su See Brennan, supra note 17, at 540 ([The [Warren] Court fundamentally reshaped the
law of this land.").
3 See id. at 540-46 (describing the process of incorporation and explaining the
incorporation debate).
3a U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
- See, e.g Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (applying to the states the double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968)
(applying to the states the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury in criminal cases );
Washington v. Texas, 388 US. 14, 22 (1967) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment
right of compulsory process to obtain witnesses in one's favor); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (applying to the states the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment);
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (applying to the
states the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1964) (applying to the states the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment); Gideon
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Those rights are incorporated. The Warren Court raised the floor,
imposing obligations on the states-in the area of criminal justice,
racial justice, etc.-that the states were not imposing on
themselves. Thus emerged the idea that the Supreme Court is the
primary guarantor, in essential ways, of federal rights and that the
federal Constitution is the primary guarantor of everyone's rights.
Thereafter, if people in a state had a complaint that state actors
were depriving them of an incorporated federal constitutional
right-preventing them from exercising their religion, preventing
them from exercising free speech, subjecting them to police
misconduct or to an unfair trial-the Civil Rights Era that grew
from the 1950s and '60s onward led people to turn to the federal
courts and to expect the federal Constitution to define and protect
their rights more expansively than their state would have been
inclined to do.35
The great Warren Court decisions started with Brown v. Board of
Education.36 Where do you go if you don't like the fact that your
state has racially segregated schools? You go to federal court and
you tell the federal judges to stop the state from violating your
rights. Where do you go if you think that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is being used in your trial? You
go to federal court because the federal courts apply an exclusionary
rule, while New York State at the time did not.37 So during the
Warren Court era, people become accustomed to the Supreme Court
raising the floor of constitutional protection. Some said the Court
was nationalizing the Bill of Rights. 8  The Supreme Court set the
federal Constitution as the lowest common denominator of rights
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (applying to the states the Sixth Amendment's
assistance of counsel clause); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying to the
states the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 US. 643, 660 (1961) (applying to the states the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
and declaring that the Fourth Amendment "is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by the due process clause").
5 See Brennan, Individual Rights, supra note 26, at 540.
- Brown v. Bd. of Educ of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495(1954).
* See People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 22, 26 (1926) (refusing to apply an exclusionary rule
in Fourth Amendment cases). The Supreme Court later diverted Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule claims from federal courts by limiting their availability as a basis for
habeas corpus petitions. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (restricting habeas
corpus petitions when prisoners are given a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate their Fourth
Amendment claims at the state level).
3 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL.
L. REV. 929, 933 (1965) (discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to the states through
incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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throughout the country.39 No state was allowed to do less, to be less
protective of any incorporated right, than what that federal floor
provided.4 0
When you have a dramatic revolution like this, greatly expanding
federal authority to limit what the states can do, there inevitably
will be backlash. Particularly in the southern states, there was a
lot of grumbling about the fact that the federal government was
telling the states what to do.4 Some of these complaints took the
form of arguments about states' rights; people started talking about
the Tenth Amendment, contending that the states have a right to be
autonomous and do what they want, so how can the federal courts
be telling the states what to do?4 2 The phrase "states' rights,"
particularly in some southern states, began to seem to observers in
the North like code for "we don't like Brown v. Board of Education
and we want to continue to be racist." The valorization of
federalism claims was regarded by some as nothing more than a
veneer for opposition to civil rights.43
But "states' rights" complaints about the Warren Court did
resuscitate a profound question we have been struggling with ever
'* See id. at 937-38 (discussing how judicial decision-making responsibilities apply to state
action by the federal government and the states).
40 See id. at 935-36 (discussing the extent of "absorption" of the Bill of Rights into state
law).
1 See John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-
Why Don't the 'Primacy' States Practice What They Preach?, 54 [I, Per. L. REv. 1019, 1023
n.18 (1993) (noting the southern states' aversion to incorporation and preference for using
state constitutional analysis).
4' Id.
4 The affiliation of states' rights arguments and racism is reflected at various points in
our history. The State of Kansas raised federalism and majoritarian rights arguments in its
brief opposing school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education. Brief for Appellant on
Reargument at 16, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) C'The people of
Kansas, through the normal processes of local government, are demonstrating their
willingness and capacity to deal with local race problems in a manner most beneficial to all
concerned. Federal interference is neither necessary nor justified."). In an earlier era, the
rights of states were asserted to explain opposition to the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on
involuntary servitude. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 17, 49 & n.166 (2004) (quoting a
congressional representative who acknowledged that the "race issue" of slavery had become
'"nerged in the higher issue of the right of the states to control their domestic affairs . . .
(Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2615 (1864) (statement of Rep. Anson Herrick)). And post-
Warren Court politicians have resorted to using states' rights positions as a proxy for
arguments about policies pertaining to race. See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed., History and
Calumny, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2007, http:lwww.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/opinion/09
brooks.html (discussing President Ronald Reagan's stress on state's rights, not civil rights, in
his 1980 election campaign); Roger Wilkins, Smiling Racism: Ronald Reagan's Race Politics,
NATION, Nov. 3, 1984, at 347 (arguing that states' rights campaign slogans gave Reagan "a
way to make racism palatable and politically potent again").
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since the founding of the republic: what do we mean by federalism?
Do we mean we're going to have fifty different kinds of flowers
blooming in fifty different gardens, each of which is going to look
unique? Do we mean we are going to have a uniform garden with
the same flowers throughout? Or do we mean that we're going to
have a garden that's carefully designed and orchestrated so it has
common themes and motifs, even though there might be different
blooms in different parts of the garden?
I'll give you one example of a case where the Supreme Court
confronted a real challenge based on a claim of local difference.
There's a case from the 1960s called Duncan v. Louisiana, in which
Gary Duncan complained about the fact that he was tried for a
crime in Louisiana and was not afforded a jury trial."4 Why didn't
Louisiana choose to give him a jury trial? Those of you who have
been to New Orleans or know anything about Louisiana know that
Louisiana was settled by people coming from the French civil law
tradition and not only the Anglo-American tradition which vaunted
jury trials.45 Everyone agreed that it is possible to have a fair trial
that's not a trial by jury. So Louisiana said, "Our tradition, our
culture, our heritage is not the heritage of the Anglo-American jury
trial, and we do things differently. We don't choose to spend our
money on jury trials. We don't choose to give our citizens that kind
of involvement and we think that should be our choice as long as
our trials are fair." In Duncan, the Supreme Court disagreed: if
Louisiana is going to be one state in the union, the Court said, then
Gary Duncan should have the same right to a trial by a jury of his
peers in Louisiana as he would in any other state.46 Louisiana
cannot choose to differ in this fundamental respect.
So the Warren Court revolution ratcheted up the limitations on
the states and required the states to be more uniform and more
consistent, promoting the ideal of nationally shared values. Well,
the Warren Court isn't with us anymore. I'm sure most of you have
noticed that. As the years passed and the pendulum swung, the
Supreme Court began carving out more exceptions and finding
fewer rights, and in some areas the nation-wide floor was lowered.
4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968).
45 See Harriet J. Bauman, French Creoles in Louisiana: An American Tale, YALE-NEW
HAVEN TEACHER'S INST., http://www.yale.edulynhti/curriculum/unitsl1992/2/92.02.02.x.html
(last visited May 22, 2012) (providing a timeline and outline of the history of Louisiana, which
features a dominant French colonial heritage). Accordingly, much of Louisiana's legal
ideology derives from French culture rather than English heritage. See id.
a9 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50.
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So at that point, William Brennan, a key figure here, started to
write about the state constitutions.47 The state constitutions had
been upstaged during the middle of the twentieth century by the
federal Constitution. If you can't go below the federally set floor, it
doesn't really matter whether the states would have chosen to do so.
They were required to meet the generally more demanding federal
standards.
Brennan, along with other scholars and judges like Justice Hans
Linde of Oregon, urged renewed attention to the state
constitutions.48 As the federal floor lowered and there were fewer
federal requirements for the states to follow, the states had the
opportunity to, in Justice Marshall's phrase, do "as their own
wisdom would suggest."' 9
As the Warren Court monolith was dismantled bit by bit, the key
question became, "What are we going to do in our state now that the
Supreme Court is leaving us more choice?"
If you want to read a wonderfully articulate account of the history
of the role of the state constitutions that I'm briefly recounting
today, I would highly recommend Judith Kaye's 1987 article, Dual
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, based on a speech she
gave at the New York City Bar Association.w In this article, Chief
Judge Kaye does an excellent job of describing the background and
history of the role of the state constitutions, which had waxed and
waned over time.5 ' The article then takes up the idea that Justice
Brennan and Justice Linde had been promoting, that it was about
time for everyone in the country to wake up and start paying more
attention to the importance of state constitutions. 2  This was a
47 See sources cited supra, notes 17 & 26; Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of
State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421-22 (1996); Ann Lousin,
.Foreword: Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who Believes in State's Rights, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1986).
4 See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 380 (1980) (arguing state bills of rights are the most fundamental, being
both "first in time and first in logic'); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and
State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 179-83 (1984) (urging autonomous Georgia constitutional
interpretation with the adoption of Georgia's new bill of rights); Jerome B. Falk, Jr.,
Foreword: The State Constitutions A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 273 (1973); Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454 (1970);
Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights". A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val.
U. L. REV. 125 (1969).
4o Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-48 (1833).
so Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
399 (1987).
5' See id. at 400-08,412-20.
5n Id. at 417-18.
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necessary reminder because most people who were trained as
lawyers in this country during the 1960s and even after were
focusing exclusively on federal constitutional law.53 Those of you
who've been to law school, when you took constitutional law, did
your course cover only federal constitutional law? Did you hear
much about the state constitutions? Probably not.
Chief Judge Kaye noted that this was a problem: not many law
schools were paying attention to state constitutions and therefore
there were a lot of lawyers who were missing bets because they just
weren't making available arguments about how the law could or
should be configured in particular states. Most everyone had
become distracted by the federal constitutional debates and forgot
that there was this whole other body of law. I've never mentioned
this to Chief Judge Kaye, but she might be interested to know that
for years now I have taught a class on state constitutional law, at
least one class in my basic constitutional law course. One of the
main things I assign the students to read is Chief Judge Kaye's
article on Dual Constitutionalisrr, because it does such an excellent
job of really setting out so much of what they need to know. I also
assign one or two sample state constitutional law opinions and the
incredibly prolix index of the New York State Constitution, which
goes on for pages and pages, plus the fifteen-section New York Bill
of Rights, so that they can compare the federal and state
constitutions.
I have a wonderful research assistant who, like a couple of you
here today, was in my constitutional law class. While I was
preparing to speak to you today, I explained to her what I was going
to cover so that she could help me to gather and sort through the
mountains of opinions and mountains of articles that Chief Judge
Kaye had written. And when I told her that my starting point for
my talk would be the article on Dual Constitutionalism, she said to
me, "Oh, I loved that article! Great! Wonderful! My colleagues will
be jealous." And she and I are not the only ones who loved that
article.
Now I want to tell you more about what was in that article
because, in addition to being a terrific introduction to state
constitutional law, this article is another very good example of the
' See Brennan, supra note 17, at 548 (protesting that state courts were so focused on
interpreting federal constitutional rulings in state cases that they didn't know how to
interpret their own state constitutions); Linde, First Things First: Rediscouering the States'
Bills of Rights, supra note 48, at 381 (reminding law schools and educators that "[t]he Federal
Bill of Rights did not supersede those of the states").
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multifaceted Kaye approach. I think you can see many different
aspects of my portrait of this judge as I talk about the portrait
embodied in Dual Constitutionalism. The author of this article is a
historian, a teacher, a writer, a New York patriot, and a true and
imaginative scholar. This 1987 article draws attention to the New
York State Constitution in particular, noting a number of things
about our Constitution that are truly unique.54 Justice Brennan
and Justice Linde had been talking about state constitutions in
general, but Chief Judge Kaye was one of the first to apply their
points to the New York State Constitution and to urge New Yorkers
to practice the art of state constitutional law.
This is another thing that I cover in my constitutional law class:
comparisons between the New York State Constitution and the
United States Constitution. If you look at the two side by side,
there are a number of provisions in the state constitution that
simply don't exist in the federal Constitution. There's a right to
education in New York.55 There's a very different definition of equal
protection that, unlike the federal Constitution, doesn't entail state
action requirements.56 There are a number of provisions that are
wholly unique.5 7 The search and seizure provision, guaranteeing
freedom from unreasonable search and seizures, is also remarkable.
In my criminal procedure class, we compare the search and seizure
provision of the New York State Constitution with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. When you line up
those two provisions, you'll notice that the first paragraphs are
exactly the same-they both say, "The right of the people to be
secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated," etc. 8  The federal Fourth Amendment only has one
paragraph. But there's a second paragraph in the New York State
Constitution which says, "The right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable interception of [telephonic] and [telegraphic]
4 Kaye, supra note 50, at 408-09.
SN.Y. COMST. art. IX, § 1
66 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
J See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (protecting ski trails in Essex County); N.Y. CONST. art. 1
§ 9 (prohibiting unregulated gambling except parimutuel betting on horse races).
i Compare U.S. CONST. arnend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."), with
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 ('The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
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communications shall not be violated," etc. 9  This amendment is
dated 1938.60
The Supreme Court's 1928 opinion in Olmstead v. United States,6 '
holding that the Fourth Amendment doesn't cover wiretapping of
telephones, always stimulates a very interesting discussion about
constitutional interpretation and originalism. Does the Fourth
Amendment mean exactly what James Madison would have thought
it meant? If we know that if we said to James Madison, "Did you
intend this language to cover telephone wiretapping?" and he'd say,
"Huh?," is that the end of the story? That was the view of the
Supreme Court in the Olmstead case in 1928. Because the Fourth
Amendment, in the view of the framers, was only intended to cover
physical intrusions, you would need to amend the Constitution to
have it cover wiretapping of telephones.
In 1938, the framers of the New York State Constitution accepted
that invitation. They added a paragraph after their replication of
the Fourth Amendment which explicitly says that the privacy of
telephone conversations should also be protected.62 It is perfectly
clear that the framers of this amendment to the New York State
Constitution rejected the holding of Olmstead. They wanted to
protect the right of the people of New York to have private
conversations in a way that the Supreme Court had decided the
Fourth Amendment, at that point in time, did not. This is all very
interesting as constitutional theory, but it also gives you some sense
of the arguments lawyers would be missing if they were to ignore
the state constitution. If, for example, you had a client who had a
telephone wiretapped during much of the twentieth century, all that
federal constitutional law offered was Olmstead. So why wouldn't
you point out to the New York courts that your client had greater
rights in New York because of this provision of the New York State
Constitution if you knew about the state constitutional provision?63
El N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 ("The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte
orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground
to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means
of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications
are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof.").
60 Id.
*' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
- N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
a See Kaye, supra note 50, at 419 (explaining that New York courts have interpreted the
state constitution as more protective of individual rights against searches and seizures than
federal standards).
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Another important point that Judge Kaye made in this article,
and other places as well, is that there's really nothing illegitimate
or suspect about interpreting state constitutional provisions as
providing greater rights even when they're worded identically to the
parallel federal provisions.64 The point is that a state constitution is
a unique document: its text may be different, its history may be
different, local conditions may be different, and the values of New
York State may be distinctive.Y
There's a case that is a very good example to me of what is special
about New York, a 1992 case that I teach in my criminal procedure
class called People v. Scottt66 In this case, Judge Kaye wrote a
masterful concurring opinion directly talking to her colleagues to
explain her view of state constitutions and the proper interpretation
of them. 67 Her concurring opinion was also talking back to a 1924
Supreme Court decision that had construed Fourth Amendment
rights quite narrowly. In Hester v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court had reviewed an incident where government agents
had gone not into someone's home, but into their open fields.68
(Doesn't that sound old-fashioned, a Thomas Hardy vision of a
countryside composed of open fields?) The Supreme Court held
that, as with the telephone in Olmstead, you don't have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in your open field.69 Anybody
including any government agent can walk into your open field and
see what you're up to, and therefore if a government agent wants to
walk into your open field on purpose to see, for example, whether
you happen to be growing marijuana in the back forty there, why
not? You don't have any Fourth Amendment rights.
When the New York Court of Appeals reviewed a similar incident
in 1992, the court looked at the New York State constitutional
search and seizure provision, which, as I have described, was clearly
intended to be broader than the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. And so, despite the fact that the Supreme
Court had found no Fourth Amendment rights in this open field
situation, the Court of Appeals found that Scott did have a right
'A Id, at 400-01; People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347 (NY. 1992) (Kaye, J., concurring).
65 Kaye, supra note 50, at 423-25 (noting that state courts, being closer to the public and
their political institutions, are more responsive in cases of constitutional misinterpretation
and can develop constitutional law as needed more efficiently than the U.S. Supreme Court).
60 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1328.
67 Id. at 1347-48 (Kaye, J., concurring).
68 Rlester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924).
69 Id. at 59.
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under the parallel state constitutional provision. The text is
somewhat different here, the history of New York is different, and
so the right was interpreted more expansively. Judge Hancock was
here this morning, and I'm going to quote him because he wrote a
line in his majority opinion in that case that makes me proud to be
a New Yorker. The state had argued that there's no reasonable
expectation of privacy out in open fields because if you're not doing
something criminal, why should you care if anyone's watching what
you're doing? Judge Hancock responded, "this presupposes the
ideal of a conforming society, a concept which seems foreign to New
York's tradition of tolerance of the unconventional or what may
appear bizarre or even offensive."70 Doesn't that make you proud to
be a New Yorker? You have a special right to be bizarre,
unconventional, and offensive.
The dissent in Scott argued that the New York provision should
be interpreted as meaning the same thing as the Fourth
Amendment.71 But Judge Kaye in her concurring opinion made the
same arguments she had made in her Dual Constitutionalism
article, eloquently expressing her belief that the state constitution
is a different and unique document, with a unique history and
context, and so it is the job of the highest court in New York State to
interpret that document independently rather than simply following
the Supreme Court's federal constitutional case law in lockstep.72
So New York can be an enclave. In New York, then, people do
have the right to be bizarre and offensive and nobody can just walk
into your open fields to see if you're growing marijuana.
Government agents are going to have to get a search warrant first.
Isn't that reassuring? A number of other states have made similar
choices to extend search and seizure protections based on their own
unique state constitutions. 3  James Madison once referred to
1o Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1337 (citing People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 564 (N.Y.
1986); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 494 (N.Y. 1986); Bellanca v. N.Y.S. Liquor
Auth., 429 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1981); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41 (N.Y.
1980)).
" Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1351 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 1347 (Kaye, J., concurring); see also Kaye, supra note 50, at 424 & n.81
(explaining the "interplay" of parallel state and federal constitutional protections).
7 See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MIss. L.J. 417,
418 (2007) (surveying points of state divergence from Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
case law); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of "Due Process
Law," 77 Miss. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (discussing whether it is appropriate for states to interpret
their state constitutions in a more right-protecting manner than the Supreme Court has
interpreted the U.S. Constitution).
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federalism as a "double security" for our rights.74 One article that I
especially admire refers to federalism as a "self-correcting
constitutional compass." 76 If the federal courts are interpreting the
federal constitution and setting the floor too low, the state
constitutions can build on that floor. Then there will be enclaves of
freedom and equality around the country. If you live in or travel to
New York, you're going to have more rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. If you live in or travel to Florida, you're
not.76 State by state.
Judge Kaye referred to what Madison called a "double security"
as a "double blessing."" She pointed out that the states, in addition
to taking care of what happens within their own state, within their
own enclave, can serve as laboratories for new policies and as
models for the other states. 8 So if the Supreme Court says that
telephone conversations are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment at all, the New York Court of Appeals can offer an
alternative by explaining why that conclusion is wrong and
unnecessary, at least according to the New York State Constitution.
Perhaps other states will then be persuaded to provide greater
rights to their own residents. And eventually, the Supreme Court
might recognize the wisdom of the New York position and federal
constitutional law itself could change. In this way, the states can
indeed be laboratories. New York State can participate in an active
dialogue with all the other states and the federal courts by
providing a model of a well-reasoned opinion saying, "This is how it
should be. Government agents should not have the right to find out
what everyone's talking about on their telephones or doing in their
open fields unless they've obtained a warrant." New York, by its
example, might precipitate changes in the law of part or all of the
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 333 (Robert Scigliano ed., Random House 2000) (1788).
75 Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 725, 731 (1981).
7 The Florida Constitution, because of a fairly recent backlash amendment, requires state
courts to interpret its search and seizure rights in conformity with U.S. Fourth Amendment
law. FLA. CONST, art. 1, § 12 ('The right . . . against unreasonable searches . . . shall be
construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in
violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information would
be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.").
7 Kaye, supra note 13, at 847; THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 74.
78 Kaye, supra note 13, at 847. Others have pointed this out too, including, most notably,





One function of legal scholarship is to describe what the law is
and what the law has been. Chief Judge Kaye has done this kind of
teaching in her scholarship. And one of the highest callings of
scholarship is not just to describe what is and has been, but to be
visionary about what law might be. There's a fascinating part of
Chief Judge Kaye's Dual Constitutionalism article that I think has
not received enough notice. I've never seen this theory articulated
in the same way any place else. Chief Judge Kaye adds one more
level to the federalist structure I have just described. Not only can
New York State be an enclave where we may have greater rights for
our residents if that's what the New York Constitution seems to
intend; not only can New York serve as a persuasive model in which
other states might follow our lead in deciding to grant additional
rights to their people; not only can New York judges write
persuasive opinions that might lead federal judges to change their
own minds. Chief Judge Kaye goes a step further by weaving one of
the most enigmatic parts of the federal Constitution into her
analysis: the Ninth Amendment 79 The Ninth Amendment says
that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not
be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the
people.so The basic idea of the Ninth Amendment seems to be that
just because there are some rights listed in the Bill of Rights, that
does not mean there aren't also other rights.8 ' Some people have
dismissed the Ninth Amendment as nothing more than a truism:
just because we named some rights doesn't mean there might not be
other rights too.82 But people have been in disagreement for a long
time about what those other rights might be and about what the
Ninth Amendment really means. Some of you may remember from
law school the case of Griswold v. Connecticut,83 which found an
implied constitutional right to reproductive freedom, in part on the
basis of the Ninth Amendment.M
Chief Judge Kaye has a different conception of the Ninth
79 See Kaye, supra note 50, at 426.
8o U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not he construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.').
a' Kaye, supra note 50, at 427.
s2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
* Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479.
s Id. at 485-86; see also i. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that the right to
privacy in a marital relationship is a basic right "within the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment").
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Amendment. She describes it in this article as creating a right of
the People to establish and alter the principles of government."
She argues that the Ninth Amendment's reference to the rights
"retained by the people" really means that the states can directly
alter federal constitutional law-that the state courts and the state
constitutions are in a two-way direct dialogue with the federal
government. 6  Under her theory, if enough states all interpret
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures as meaning
that government agents can't go into your open fields or tap your
telephones without a warrant, at some point the fact that so many
states have concluded this should filter back directly into federal
constitutional interpretation. 7
This is not only a theory of federalism-that the dialogue goes
both ways, that state courts have the power to constrain federal
courts, in addition to federal courts telling the states what to do.
It's also a unique theory of federal constitutional interpretation.
Under Kaye's vision of the Ninth Amendment, a dynamic dual
constitutionalism is incorporated into the constitutional text itself.
Federal constitutional law of necessity must be flexible and must
change in order to take account of what most of the people in most
of the states think. So if the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment as oblivious to certain kinds of privacy, the states can
push back and insist that their own views of the importance of
privacy transform federal constitutional law itself on that subject.88
If enough states agree, under Kaye's theory, the Supreme Court
would have to listen.
The Supreme Court has not expressly adopted Judith Kaye's
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, and they certainly haven't
cited her article. But Judith Kaye says in one of her articles that
she thinks the Ninth Amendment's time will come."9 And what I
think is fascinating is that in a way, her prediction has come true.
Here's what the Supreme Court has been doing, albeit without
mentioning the Ninth Amendment. Recent federal constitutional
interpretation has been directly responsive to what's been
happening in the states in a number of areas. I'll give you two
different examples.
The first example is the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits
a Kaye, supra note 50, at 428.
8 Id. at 427-28.





cruel and unusual punishment.90 What does that prohibition mean?
For a long time the Supreme Court has said that to determine
what's cruel and unusual, we have to look at what everyone in our
society is doing and not doing.91
There are three Eighth Amendment opinions within the last
decade which all adopt the same very particular state canvassing
methodology, and they are all cases about the imposition of the
death penalty. As I am sure you know, the Supreme Court has
rejected the position that the death penalty is in and of itself cruel
and unusual.92 But the Court has decided three cases which find
the death penalty to be cruel and unusual as imposed in particular
circumstances: Atkins v. Virginia,93 Roper v. Simmons,94 and
Kennedy v. Louisiana.95 In one of those cases, the Supreme Court
says it is cruel and unusual to execute people who are mentally
retarded, because they are neither deterrable nor blameworthy.m
How can you execute someone who did not have the capacity to
know what he or she was doing? In the second, the Court held that
it is cruel and unusual to execute a person for a crime committed as
a juvenile because juveniles are not mature enough to appreciate
what they are doing.97 And in the third, the Court found that it is
cruel and unusual to execute people for crimes that do not result
and were not intended to result in anyone's death. 8
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court used the same, quite
controversial, methodology. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing two
out of three of these opinions, counted noses, looking at what was
happening in all of the states. 9 There is a lot of arithmetic in these
opinions. How many states do not apply the death penalty to the
mentally retarded, or to juveniles, or to non-homicide offenses? In
how many states have the legislatures recently changed their minds
90 U.S. CONSTr. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required. nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
9 Specifically, "[tjo determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must
look beyond historical conceptions to 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.'" Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)): see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(stating that the power to punish must be "exercised within the limits of civilized standards').
1 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
9 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US. 304, 321 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008).
w Atkins. 536 U.S. at 321,
9 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
9 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421.
9 Id. at 423; Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
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and decided to make the death penalty inapplicable in such
circumstances?o0 It used to be the case that X number of states
allowed execution of juveniles, but now Y number of states do not
allow such executions. Kennedy examines the numbers and the
trends. So in the Eighth Amendment area, if you get enough
states-either by their legislatures or by their state courts
interpreting their own constitutions-concluding that it is cruel to
execute people for crimes committed while they were juveniles,
those decisions then throw roots into federal constitutional law.
That is a direct impact of state decisions on federal constitutional
law, not just a matter of federal judges deciding that a particular
state court opinion is persuasive and should be followed. And that
is essentially the Ninth Amendment vision of Judith Kaye-that
state decisions in the aggregate can directly transform federal law.
One other example of this two-way, state-federal dialogue is in
the case of Lawrence v. Texas,"o" where the Court's decision was
based on substantive due process.0 2 The question there was
whether the Texas law that criminalized consensual sodomy was a
violation of due process because it unduly infringed on the liberty to
decide on one's lifestyle.103 In the opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,
Justice Kennedy uses the same methodology as in the Eighth
Amendment cases to reach this result. He looks at the number of
states criminalizing consensual sodomy, he counts up how many
state legislatures have recently changed their minds and decided to
decriminalize consensual sodomy, and considers the number of state
courts which have found criminalization of consensual sodomy to
violate their own state constitutions.0 4 He counts, he reviews the
numbers and the trends, and he sees which way the wind is
blowing. And because so many states have made the decision in
their own enclaves, in their own states, to say, 'This is not
something that the government should be permitted to do, to
criminalize people because of their chosen sexual lives," that liberty
now has become enshrined as part of federal constitutional law.
IV. CHIEF JUDGE KAYE, VINDICATED
So Chief Judge Kaye, one gift I want to give you today is the gift
too See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-678.
IMo Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
'o2 Id. at 578.
10 Id.
u Id. at 573, 577-78.
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of vindication. I have not seen anybody formally put together your
concept of the Ninth Amendment and the dynamic workings of
federalism in the Supreme Court cases I've just described. In
addition to being a very fine explication of how dual
constitutionalism works and could work, your article's vision of dual
constitutionalism as a two-way street, as a way for the states, in
combination, to have a direct impact on federal constitutional law,
was prescient.
Chief Judge Kaye has also written other articles expanding on
her ideas about state constitutional law and dual
constitutionalism. 05 And I think another very appropriate note
here is that when NYU Law School started a lecture series named
for Justice William Brennan, Chief Judge Kaye gave the inaugural
William Brennan lecture.t06 Quite appropriately, she talked about
this tradition of state constitutional law. I think that Justice
Brennan would have been delighted with the choice of speaker and
of topic. 107
In addition to her views on state constitutional law, Chief Judge
Kaye also has complex and nuanced ideas about when courts should
use constitutional interpretation and when they should prefer other
available tools, like state common law.108 There are other New York
Court of Appeals opinions that I teach in my criminal procedure
class, including a case called People v. Hollman, in which the New
York Court of Appeals laid out a number of rules for police-citizen
encounters that are based not on the state constitution but rather
on state common law.09 And Judith Kaye has written engagingly
on these topics as well. 110
The care with which Judith Kaye set about making nuanced
decisions about what type of law to apply in individual cases is also
completely consistent with the care she lavished on her judicial
opinions and her 200 articles, the care she took in managing the
io^ See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 13; Judith S. Kaye, State Constitutional Law and the State
High Courts in the 21st Century, 70 ALB. L. REV. 825 (2007); Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I.
Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 373 (2001); Judith S. Kaye, Foreword State Courts in Our Federal System: The
Contribution of the New York Court of Appeals, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 217 (1996); Judith S.
Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of American
Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49 (1988).
1o6 Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts
Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1995).
"o7 Id.; see also Kaye, supra note 15 (honoring Justice William Brennan).
"" Kaye, supra note 106, at 5-11.
1ce People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 212 (N.Y. 1992).
1o See supra text accompanying note 105.
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courts of New York State, and-this will be the last note I will offer
toward my part of the portrait of this judge-the care she takes in
selecting her shoes.
